What happens when a BRICS country comes under intense pressure? Nothing. After two decades, BRICS has more flags, less power.

Two decades after forming to challenge U.S. geopolitical dominance, BRICS is now further from its goals than ever…thanks in large part to U.S. President Donald Trump.

Trump has exploited the difference between an impressive collection of countries and a functioning geopolitical alliance.

Unfortunately for BRICS, expansion is not the same thing as progress.

BRICS began officially operating as a diplomatic group in 2006, when Brazil, Russia, India and China held their first foreign ministers’ meeting. Twenty years later, it has expanded — on paper, at least — to 11 countries representing nearly half the world’s population and roughly 40 percent of global economic output when measured by purchasing-power parity.

Those numbers sound formidable and impressive. But adding together the populations, resources and economies of 11 different countries does not transform them into a single geopolitical actor.

Far from it.

India’s economy is not available for China to deploy. On the contrary, China doesn’t trust India enough to cooperate on AI. And that’s just the tip of the iceberg.

Saudi oil is not a BRICS strategic reserve. Brazil’s agricultural production does not automatically become leverage for Russia. The members retain control of their own resources, frequently pursue incompatible policies and sometimes regard one another as strategic competitors.

BRICS has confused accumulation with integration.

China wants the organization to weaken American leadership while expanding Beijing’s influence. Russia wants help evading Western sanctions. Iran wants protection from economic isolation. India wants greater influence without becoming subordinate to China. Brazil wants development financing while retaining access to Western markets. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates welcome Chinese commerce but continue relying heavily on American security.

No one is getting what they wanted out of BRICS.

Those are not variations on a common strategy. They are different strategies occasionally concealed beneath a shared summit declaration.

BRICS has made some concrete progress. It established the New Development Bank, which had approved approximately $35.6 billion in financing by the end of 2025. Members conduct more trade in national currencies, making American sanctions somewhat less effective. The organization has also given developing countries another venue in which to criticize Western policies and demand greater representation in international institutions.

But these are escape hatches around parts of the American-led system, not a replacement for that system.

The New Development Bank remains relatively small and dependent upon international capital markets. Much of its cumulative lending has been denominated in dollars. After Russia invaded Ukraine and came under sanctions, the bank suspended new transactions involving Russia to preserve its own access to global finance.

That episode should have ended the illusion that BRICS had already built a parallel economic order. When forced to choose between protecting a founding member and preserving its access to the Western financial system, its signature institution protected itself.

The most revealing test is what happens when a BRICS country — or a close partner — comes under intense pressure.

Russia was sanctioned, and BRICS did not rescue it. China and India purchased discounted Russian energy, but largely because doing so served their own interests. They did not create a collective BRICS program to defend Russia or overturn the sanctions regime.

Iran was blockaded and economically squeezed, and BRICS did not break the pressure campaign. China continued offering diplomatic support but proved unwilling to risk a larger confrontation to protect Tehran. Membership brought Iran another platform from which to complain about American power, but not an alliance prepared to neutralize it.

China lost its advantageous position around the Panama Canal, and BRICS did nothing. Panama withdrew from Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, while a Panamanian court invalidated the concessions held by Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison at the ports of Balboa and Cristóbal. The canal itself always remained under Panamanian control, but Chinese commercial influence around this critical waterway suffered a serious setback.

Nicolás Maduro was removed from Venezuela, and his powerful friends could not protect him. Venezuela was not a full BRICS member, but it was closely aligned with China, Russia and Iran. Washington has since reestablished substantial influence over Venezuela’s energy sector, further weakening the anti-American network in the Western Hemisphere.

India, Brazil and the Gulf states were unwilling to place their American relationships in danger in any of these cases. That is not irrational. Access to American markets, capital and military capabilities remains more valuable than anything BRICS can collectively provide.

President Donald Trump deserves credit for recognizing and exploiting this weakness.

His tariff threats against governments supporting a BRICS replacement for the dollar force each member to calculate the cost individually. He does not have to defeat BRICS as a unified bloc because it rarely behaves like one. His moves in Panama and Venezuela have also reasserted American influence in its own hemisphere while demonstrating the limits of Chinese and Russian protection.

This is America First geopolitics at its most effective: identify an adversarial coalition’s internal divisions, apply pressure selectively and make prospective defectors consider what they could lose.

That does not mean every Trump tactic is without risk. Indiscriminate pressure could drive otherwise friendly countries closer to China. Nor should the United States dismiss legitimate complaints about the IMF, World Bank or unequal representation in international institutions. BRICS will retain appeal as long as developing countries believe Washington takes their cooperation for granted.

But after 20 years, BRICS’s progress toward displacing American leadership remains embarrassingly miniscule. It has no common currency, integrated market, enforceable foreign policy or mutual-defense commitment. It cannot reliably protect members from sanctions, blockade or military pressure. Its members will cooperate when their interests coincide and retreat when the costs become uncomfortable.

BRICS has learned to complain about the American-led order collectively. It has not learned to act collectively against it.

It is a mechanism for gaining leverage within the existing order — not a replacement for that order. Trump did not create its internal contradictions, but he has become notably effective at turning them to America’s advantage.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)